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THE FLYING TIGERS AND PEARL HARBOR - - THE REST OF THE STORY
By: Alan Armstrong*
A DATE THAT WILL LIVE IN INFAMY: It is December 6, 1941. To the south of the island of Oahu, there are five Japanese submarines laying in wait. Shortly after midnight on December 7, five midget submarines are released by their mother craft I-16, only seven miles from the entrance to Pearl Harbor.
As dawn breaks on December 7, six Japanese aircraft carriers, the Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku, launch the first wave of 183 aircraft that will attack Pearl Harbor. At 0637 the U.S.S. Ward fires upon and sinks a Japanese midget submarine, just outside the harbor.
At 0749 Commander Fuchida gives the order to high altitude bombers: “To, To, To” as the first syllable of totsugeki which means “charge.” Four minutes later, Fuchida’s radioman sends the signal: “To-Ra, To-Ra, To-Ra.” Complete surprise had been achieved.
As the Aloha Clock Tower showed 0755, bombs began to rain down on Ford Island Naval Air Station and on Wheeler and Hickam Fields in the island paradise of Hawaii. While the Aichi Naval Type 99 Carrier-Based bombers (“Vals”) and Mitsubishi Naval Type 00 Fighters (“Zeroes”) were bombing and strafing American fighter planes, Nakajima Naval Type 97 Carrier-Based bombers (“Kates”) were commencing their approach to launch Type 91 torpedoes on the American Pacific Fleet at about 0757. At 0758 Ford Island dispatched a message: “Air Raid Pearl Harbor. This is not (a) drill.” By 0805, Pearl Harbor and the surrounding airfields were in total chaos as plumes of smoke and explosions erupted into the sky. Kates laden with armor piercing bombs commenced their attack on the American ships from 10,000 feet. One such bomb penetrated the upper deck and several lower decks of the USS Arizona where it exploded adjacent to the magazine, blowing the ship in two. The first wave withdrew around 0829.
The second wave comprised of 35 Zeroes, 78 Vals and 54 Kates operating as high altitude bombers arrived over Pearl Harbor at 0854, giving the Americans about a 25 minute respite between attacks.
* Alan Armstrong is an aviation lawyer in Atlanta Georgia and an active air show pilot. Mr. Armstrong has written a book entitled Preemptive Strike - - The Secret Plan that Would Have Prevented the Attack on Pearl Harbor (Globe Pequot Press, 2006).
American armed forces were caught unaware on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. There was no combat air patrol. No American patrol bombers or reconnaissance aircraft were looking for a carrier strike force of the Imperial Japanese Navy approximately 200 miles north of Oahu. America suffered 2,403 casualties with 1,178 wounded during the nightmarish attack on Pearl Harbor. A number of American battleships and support vessels were sunk or substantially damaged.
On the following day, President Roosevelt gave a speech before a Joint Session of Congress declaring that the attack was “unprovoked and dastardly.” It was, according to our President, a “date that will live infamy.” There were, however, a number of facts not brought to light by President Roosevelt on December 8, 1941. This article will explore “the rest of the Pearl Harbor story.”
AN EFFICIENT GUERILLA AIR CORPS: The date was January 17, 1940, almost two years before the attack on Pearl Harbor. There was a quiet and confidential meeting in the Office of the Navy Department. Documents with no addressee and no signature were delivered by Bruce Leighton (Commander, USN, Ret.). An Annapolis graduate, Leighton had served as a naval aviator, and after his retirement had become Vice-President of Intercontinent Corporation and its affiliate the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company (CAMCO). Intercontinent ran the Chinese National Airline (CNAC), and CAMCO sold and serviced both civilian and military aircraft operated in China. McCollum was meeting with Major Rodney A. Boone, USMC who served in the Office of Naval Intelligence. Boone and Leighton discussed the organization of “an efficient guerilla air corps” that would operate American aircraft flown by American pilots under the cover of the Chinese Air Force against the Japanese Empire.
While Boone may be an obscure figure, his boss was anything but obscure. Boone’s immediate superior was Commander Arthur McCollum. McCollum provided intelligence information to Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations and also to President Roosevelt. Boone wrote a memorandum discussing his meeting with Leighton and advocated the formation of an American guerilla air corps in China that would operate as a private business venture financed by banks and institutions that would assist the Chinese war effort against Japan in the undeclared Sino-Japanese War.
Leighton’s pitch for a commercial enterprise employing mercenaries made sense. It was a cost-effective way to aid China, and, as a private business venture, would not give Japan grounds to object. It would not be an “official” American military mission to China.
REPORT NO. 161-40: On September 30, 1940, the American Naval Attaché in Tokyo dispatched a report to the Navy Department with the following comments: “(1) Fire fighting facilities are willfully inadequate, (2) Incendiary bombs sowed widely over an area of Japanese cities would result in the destruction of the major portions of these cities…, (3) Bomb shelters are few in number and totally inadequate…, and (4) A complete list of important bombing objectives, including aircraft factories, steel and gas works, main transportation systems, and government buildings will be prepared and forwarded.”
THE MCCOLLUM MEMORANDUM: After Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940, Commander McCollum authored an eight point action memorandum of October 7, 1940, which was calculated to induce Japan to commit an overt act of war against the United States. McCollum wrote, in part:
- It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following course of action is suggested…Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek… Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil… Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire… If by these means Japan could not be lead to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.
CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT: In 1933, Claire Chennault led a fighter group in bomber-interception exercises. Chennault took exception to the conventional wisdom in the Army Air Corps that the bomber was the invincible and unstoppable weapon in future air warfare. His thesis The Role of Defensive Pursuant offended General Hap Arnold and condemned Chennault to suffer abuse at the hands of his superior officers in the Air Corps. An instructor in fighter tactics at the Air Tactical School at Maxwell Field in Montgomery, Alabama, Chennault and his wingmen Billy McDonald and Luke Williamson gave their farewell performance as The Three Men on The Flying Trapeze at the 1935 Air Races in Miami. They were met by Colonel Mow of the Chinese Air Force in the company of William Pawley, the President of Intercontinent and CAMCO. Mow wanted Chennault and his wingmen to come to China and train and organize the fledgling Chinese Air Force. While Chennault declined the offer, his wingmen bought up their contracts with the Army and sailed for China.
Succumbing to the intense pressure of his superior officers, Chennault finally had a nervous breakdown and was forced to retire in April of 1937. By that time, China had raised the ante. It would put Chennault in charge of the Chinese Air Force, allow him to decide which aircraft would be acquired for operation in the Chinese Air Force, and allow him to develop and administer the training curriculum for Chinese pilots. Despite having a wife and eight children, the new offer was one Chennault could not refuse. He made his way to China just as the Sino-Japanese War erupted on July 7, 1937, and found himself flying air combat in the skies of China in a Hawk 75 fighter plane. Chennault’s passport gave his occupation as “farmer,” and he was officially employed by the Bank of China as a consultant.
THE PLUS FOUR: The “Plus Four” were key members of President Roosevelt’s cabinet. They were Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury; Cordell Hull, Secretary of State; Henry Stimson, Secretary of War; and Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy. Believing that America’s entry into the First War had been a mistake, America enacted the Neutrality Laws of 1935 which made it illegal to sell war materiels to foreign combatants. In time, however, the Neutrality Laws were relaxed to allow foreign countries to buy war materiels if they paid for them with cash, and if the goods were delivered aboard ships that were not American vessels. If one were going to circumvent the Neutrality Laws, then Secretary Morgenthau would be the perfect choice, since he held the purse strings to the treasury. This explains why Roosevelt selected Morgenthau to “loan” China $100,000,000.00 to prop up its war effort and pay for aircraft and men that would ostensibly operate under cover of the Chinese Air Force.
MORGENTHAU’S MEETING WITH CHENNAULT: Henry Morgenthau was a very powerful man in the Roosevelt administration. Although technically the Secretary of the Treasury, he acted in spheres outside his portfolio. In effect, he also acted as Secretary of War and Secretary of State. This explains why Morgenthau met with Claire Chennault, General Mow and T.V. Soong (the brother of Madame Chiang) on Saturday evening, September 21, 1940. Overtures from Chiang Kai-shek and Soong to President Roosevelt and the Plus Four had been received with favor in relation to providing China with bombers to bomb Japan. Morgenthau wanted to meet the architect of this plan and find out exactly what he wanted and how he proposed to use the bombers. The topics discussed during the meeting between Morgenthau and Chennault were: (1) the type of bombers to be employed, Boeing B-17s or Lockheed Hudsons, (2) the fact that the B-17 could reach Tokyo, but the Hudson could only reach Nagasaki, Kobe, and Osaka from bases in China, (3) that the bombing would have to be done at night because American fighter planes did not possess the range to escort the bombers all the way to targets in Japan, (4) that there were two bases in Chekiang Province for the B-17s and four bases in Chekiang Province for the Hudsons, and (5) the use of incendiary bombs was also a topic of discussion.
The day following the meeting between Chennault and Morgenthau, a meeting of the Plus Four together with Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall resulted in the bombing plan being deferred. Instead, the Chinese Air Force would get 100 P-40 fighter planes as a consolation prize. This would be the genesis for the American Volunteer Group (“AVG”) which was later called “The Flying Tigers.”
CONCERNS IN JAPAN ABOUT BOMBING: On January 7, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto, the Commander of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy wrote:
- [W]e cannot rule out the possibility that the enemy would dare to launch an attack upon our homeland and burn down our capitol and other cities…
Three days later, General Hideki Tojo made the following declaration before the Japanese Cabinet:
- [W]e must be prepared for the danger of incessant air raids in time of emergency.
KEEPING THE THING QUIET: On February 3, 1941, W.K. Keys dispatched a memorandum to Navy Secretary Knox confirming that Chennault and Pawley had worked out a deal to purchase 100 Curtis P-40 fighter planes. Keys’ memorandum ended with this striking comment: “They realize the necessity of keeping the thing quiet and will take due precautions.” Why was it so important to keep the thing quiet? Several points come to mind. First, we did not want the Japanese to know what we were up to in terms of forming the American Volunteer Group. Secondly, for a representative of a foreign country to recruit Americans in the United States to fight as members in a foreign army was a crime. Third, Americans who served in the armed forces of a foreign power were at risk of losing their citizenship. Fourth, in light of the popularity enjoyed by Charles Lindbergh and Henry Ford in the America First Movement, what would Lindbergh and Ford have done if they had received word that America was forming a guerilla air corps to fight in China?
CHENNAULT’S LETTER OF INTRODUCTION: Captain Frank Beatty was the Aide to Navy Secretary Frank Knox. In the spring of 1941, Beatty and his secretary were busy organizing a guerilla air corps from his office in the Navy Department. On April 14, 1941, Beatty wrote the following letter of introduction for Claire Chennault to the commanding officers of Naval Air Stations in Jacksonville, Pensacola, Norfolk and San Diego: “1. This letter introduces Mr. C. L. Chennault, who has the permission of the Navy Department to visit your station. 2. He will explain the purpose of his visit.”
THE BOMBING PLAN IS ON AGAIN: General Marshall was not entirely successful in his efforts to stop Chennault and his plan to bomb Japan. Lauchlin Currie, Ph.D., who received his degree in economics from Harvard, was dispatched to China in the winter of 1941. Currie had returned to the United States by the spring of 1941 and was convinced that Chennault’s plans for bombing Japan from China were sound. Currie determined that the British were not timely taking delivery of Lockheed Hudsons built in Burbank, California. He proposed to divert some of the British Hudsons to China. The Army Air Corps would not agree to relinquish some of its B-17 Flying Fortresses, so the Hudson was the only bombing platform available to Currie and Chennault for the American Volunteer Group.
JAPAN KNOWS AND AMERICA KNOWS THAT JAPAN KNOWS OF THE PLAN: On May 29, 1941, Japanese Radio Circular Number 1139 was dispatched from Tokyo to Japanese headquarters throughout Southeast Asia. The Radio Circular warned that America was sending Boeing B-17 bombers to China, and “…a Boeing can leave a given base in China, fly to Tokyo, raid the city for two hours, and then fly back to China…” The source of this information was a spy or double agent with the code name of “PA” who was either in or close to Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang Government. Of more concern, however, is the fact that this diplomatic message in Purple Code was translated by American cryptographers on June 3, 1941. By the summer of 1941, America knew that Japan knew about America’s ambitions to bomb Japan from China.
JOINT ARMY/NAVY BOARD 355: The Joint Army/Navy Board 355 Plan bore the innocent name “Aircraft Requirements for the Chinese Government.” However, the Joint Board Plan was far more than a plan merely providing airplanes to China. It was the blueprint for the formation and operation of the American Volunteer Group. The time schedule for the Joint Board Plan called for P-40 operations to begin in July 1941, with bomber operations and P-43 operations to begin in September 1941. There would be 100 P-40 Tomahawks in operation by July, and 100 bombardment types and 100 airplanes of the P-43 type in operation by September. That would be the first phase of operations. The second phase of operations would include an additional 100 P-43 or P-47 fighters, 50 P-39 fighters, and 50 additional bombardment aircraft in the form of Lockheed Hudsons, B-26 aircraft or B-23 aircraft. According to page eight of the Joint Board Plan, the Tactical Objective was “defense of air bases, Burma Highway, supplies in transit and in storage in Yunnan Province and industrial establishments in the vicinity of Kunming, Yunnan…” The strategic objective on page eight of the Joint Board Plan was:
- To force the Japanese to divert a portion of the Air Force now available for expeditionary use to the defense of his bases in Indo-China and counter offensive operations in Yunnan Province.
The third strategic objective of the Joint Board Plan on page nine was “destruction of Japanese supplies and supply ships in order to handicap operations of an expeditionary force to the south of Indo-China.”
American military planners knew that Japan would strike south to the Dutch East Indies for oil, would invade Singapore, Burma, Malaya and the Philippines. Much of the Japanese expeditionary force that eventually executed the invasions sailed from the Yangtze River in China. The fourth strategic objective of the Joint Board Plan was to destroy the Japanese industry. The Joint Board Plan included the distance in air miles from Chuchow (near the southeast coast of China), the principal area from which the bombers would operate to bomb various targets in Japan.
ROOSEVELT ENDORSES THE JOINT BOARD PLAN: Madame Chiang dispatched a telegram from Chungking to Dr. Currie of July 22, 1941, asking about the delivery of the American bombers. On July 23, 1941, President Roosevelt endorsed the Joint Board Plan calling for the bombing of Japan. Two days later, President Roosevelt imposed a total trade embargo on the Japanese Empire. The stage was set for war to erupt between America and the Japanese Empire.
MARSHALL AND THE AMERICAN PRESS TIP OFF THE JAPANESE: General Marshall, who had initially opposed the Joint Board Plan called a “secret press conference” on Saturday, November 15, 1941, to tell the press to keep quiet about American plans to bomb Japan. Three days later a news story ran in the New York Times written by reporter Arthur Krock, announcing that America intended to bomb Japan in the event of war. On October 31, 1941, a news story ran in US News entitled “Bomber Lanes to Japan.” The cat was out of the bag. Japan did not require an elaborate spy network to appreciate American ambitions to bomb Japan would soon be realized.
WHERE WERE THE AMERICAN CARRIERS? Neither the Enterprise nor the Lexington was at Pearl Harbor during the attack. They were delivering fighter planes to Wake Island and Midway Island to provide air cover for B-17s that were being flown across the Pacific to the Philippines to bomb Japan. This explains why a force of B-17s was landing on Oahu at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. America had a stockpile of 2,800,000 gallons of aviation fuel in China in addition to 375,000 gallons of British aviation fuel. America and Britain planned to reduce Japan economically by a trade embargo. If that failed, military force would be brought to bear on the Japanese Empire. Japan knew it and launched a preemptive strike on the American forces at Pearl Harbor.
A JAPANESE BLUNDER: The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a foolish blunder and an act of desperation. While the Japanese forces of the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1941 held a numerical (and some would argue qualitative) advantage over the American Pacific Fleet, for Japan to engage in warfare with an industrial giant like America was suicidal. This is more than amply demonstrated by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Seven months after Pearl Harbor the U.S. Navy turned the tables on Japan during the Battle of Midway when four Japanese carriers were sunk. For the remainder of the war in the Pacific, Japan was in a defensive posture. After Japanese Kamikaze attacks failed to stop the advancing American forces, her only option was national suicide. Eventually, she surrendered, but only after America deployed nuclear weapons.
A REEXAMINATION OF CHENNAULT’S PLAN: Claire Chennault in his autobiography, Way of a Fighter wrote the following about his plan to bomb Japan before Pearl Harbor:
- “My plan proposed to throw a small but well-equipped air force into China. Japan, like England, floated her lifeblood on the seas and could be defeated more easily by slashing her salty arteries than by stabbing for her heart. Airbases in Free China could have put all of the vital supply lines and advanced staging areas under attack. Begun in time and developed with sufficient weight, an air offensive from China could have smashed the Japanese southern offensive before it left its home ports and staging areas.”
If Chennault had been equipped with 200 fighter planes and 100 bombers by September of 1941, is there any doubt he would have attacked the Japanese invasion forces that sailed from the Yangtze River on November 25, 1941? If Chennault had pulled the trigger before December 7, 1941, who can dispute the commanders in Hawaii would have been on a heightened alert? If Japan had begun suffering nightly air raids at the hands of the American Volunteer Group in the fall of 1941, would its carrier strike force have sailed to attack Hawaii, or would the airfields in and around Chuchow in southeast China have been of greater interest? Those are questions we may ponder as we consider “the rest of the Pearl Harbor Story.”
Copyright 2007, Alan Armstrong. All Rights Reserved.
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